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W1TNEssEs-PRioR CoNVICTION OF CRIME To IMPEACH-CrncuMSTANCES oF
SENTENCING NoT AnMissmLE-ln an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in 1945, at which time he was a prisoner of the State of Virginia, plaintiff
testified in his own behalf at the jury trial. On cross-examination, he admitted
that he had been convicted of assault in 1943, that sentence had been suspended
on condition that he enter the service, and that he had been sentenced to jail
when he failed to enter the service. In his argument, defendant's attorney declared
that the action had its inception in 1943, and emphasized that plaintiff had failed
to enter the service when the sentence for assault was suspended. Verdict and
judgment entered for defendant. On appeal, held, reversed. The introduction
of evidence relating to plaintiff's failure to enter the service, and the argument
of defendant's attorney referring to that failure, were improper and prejudicial.
Hockaday v. Red Line, (App. D.C. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 154.
In almost all jurisdictions, a conviction of crime may be shown to impeach
a witness in a civil suit.1 Two principal questions arise as to such a showing:
(1) What sort of crime can be used to impeach? (2) May the conviction be
brought out on cross-examination? The range of decisions on the former point
is so diverse as to defy summary description. 2 As to the latter, the conllict narrows
to two views: that only the record of conviction may be shown;3 and that conviction can be introduced also on cross-examination.4 The better view allows
introduction on cross-examination, since the flexibility of procedure is greatly

3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§980, 981, 987 (1940); 41 A.L.R. 337 (1926).
A great part of the diversity is dependent upon statutory differences. See, for example:
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1939) §13444-2; N.Y. Consol. Laws Ann. (McKinney, 1944) Penal
Law, §2444; ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 51, §1; c. 38, §734; Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1938) §27.912, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §617.63; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§2-1725.
The crime must bear on veracity of witness: Richardson v. Gage, 28 S.D. 390, 133
N.W. 692 (1911); must be a felony: Hunt v. State, 114 Ark. 239, 169 S.W. 773 (1914);
must involve moral turpitude: Ex parte Marshall, 207 Ala. 566, 93 S. 471 (1922); may be
"any crime": Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343, 101 N.E. 989 (1913). In many instances,
the crime has little bearing on the issue of credibility. The showing of assault in the
principal case is in that class. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §982 (1940).
s 6 A.L.R. 1638 (1920); 25 A.L.R. 347 (1923); 41 A.L.R. 340 (1926); 103 A.L.R.
362 (1936); 161 A.L.R. 267 (1946). The cases cited in these annotations represent a
minority rule.
4 Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Weathered, (C.C.A. 5th, 1932) 62 F. (2d) 78; Bockman
v. Rorex, 212 Ark. 948, 208 S.W. (2d) 991 (1948); Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 204 S.C. 374, 29 S.E. (2d) 488 (1944). See also 6 A.L.R. 1635 (1920); 25 A.L.R.
346 (1923); 41 A.L.R. 337 (1926); 103 A.L.R. 362 (1936); 161 A.L.R. 253 (1946).
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increased. The witness can hardly be in error on such an important matter, and
the likelihood of surprise is negligible. 5 The principal case, however, illustrates
difficulties produced when cross-examination is extended in such a fashion as to
become highly prejudicial. As a consistent principle, such an extension of the
cross-examination into questions which are of doubtful relevance, yet at the same
time highly prejudicial, is regarded as ground for reversal. 6 Evidence of plaintiff's
failure to enter the service should not have been received, since, even though
it might have possessed a limited relevance, control of its effect upon the jury
would have been impossible. In view of the conduct of defendant's attorney in
employing the subject-matter in his argument to the jury, introduction of the
evidence was plainly prejudicial. Conduct of defendant's attorney in attempting
to link the conviction to the instant action, and in emphasizing plaintiff's disobedience to the wishes of a court, was in itself sufficient to justify the setting
aside of the verdict and judgment in the lower court.7

J. D. McLeod, S.Ed.
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §981 (1940).
Powell v. State, 195 Miss. 161, 13 S. (2d) 622 (1943); People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.
App. (2d) 723, 112 P. (2d) 979 (1941); Lee Kwong Nom v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d,
1927) 20 F. (2d) 470; Bunch v. Texas Employers Ins. Assn., (Tex. Civ. App., 1948) 209
(2d) 657.
7 Testimony brought in for purposes of impeachment can be used only in that way,
and not to excite prejudice. State v. Jackson, 336 Mo. 1069, 83 S.W. (2d) 87 (1935).
See also Union Pac. R. Co. Field, (C.C.A. 8th, 1905) 137 F. 14; N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v.
Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 49 S.Ct. 300 (1929); 6 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1807 (1940).
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